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1. Introduction
A technical safeguards challenge has remained for decades for the IAEA to identify possible 
diversion of nuclear fuel pins from Light Water Reactor (LWR) spent fuel assemblies.  In 
fact, as modern nuclear power plants are pushed to higher power levels and longer fuel cycles, 
fuel failures (i.e., “leakers”) as well as the corresponding fuel assembly repairs (i.e., 
“reconstitutions”) are commonplace occurrences within the industry. Fuel vendors have 
performed hundreds of reconstitutions in the past two decades, thus, an evolved know-how 
and sophisticated tools exist to disassemble irradiated fuel assemblies and replace damaged 
pins with dummy stainless steel or other type rods.
Various attempts have been made in the past two decades to develop a technology to identify 
a possible diversion of pin(s) and to determine whether some pins are missing or replaced 
with dummy or fresh fuel pins. However, to date, there are no safeguards instruments that can 
detect a possible pin diversion scenario to the requirements of the IAEA. The FORK detector
system [1-2] can characterize spent fuel assemblies using operator declared data, but it is not 
sensitive enough to detect missing pins from spent fuel assemblies.  Likewise, an emission 
computed tomography system [3] has been used to try to detect missing pins from a spent fuel 
assembly, which has shown some potential for identifying possible missing pins but this 
capability has not yet been fully demonstrated. The use of such a device in the future would 
not be envisaged, especially in an inexpensive, easy to handle setting for field applications.
In this article, we describe a concept and ongoing research to help develop a new safeguards 
instrument for the detection of pin diversions in a PWR spent fuel assembly. The proposed 
instrument is based on one or more very thin radiation detectors that could be inserted within 
the guide tubes of a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) assembly.  Ultimately, this work could 
lead to the development of a detector cluster and corresponding high-precision driving system 
to collect radiation signatures inside PWR spent fuel assemblies. The data obtained would 
provide the spatial distribution of the neutron and gamma flux fields within the spent fuel 
assembly, while the data analysis would be used to help identify missing or replaced pins.
Monte Carlo simulations have been performed to help validate this concept using a realistic 
17x17 PWR spent fuel assembly [4-5]. The initial results of this study show that neutron
profile in the guide tubes, when obtained in the presence of missing pins, can be identifiably
different from the profiles obtained without missing pins, Our latest simulations have focused 
upon a specific type of fission chamber that could be tested for this application.
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2. Methodology
In order to study the effect on missing or replaced spent fuel pins, simulation studies were
done using a Monte Carlo code MCNP5. The fuel assembly modeled was the Takahama-3 
17x17 PWR spent fuel assembly [7], which was loaded with 248 UO2 fuel pins, 4.1 w/o U-
235 enrichment, 16 UO2-Gd2O3 pins (2.6% wt U-235 and 6 w/o gadolinium) and 25 water 
rods The assembly was irradiated for three cycles with a power of 38.6 W/gU, and cooled for 
2 years. The depletion of the assembly was achieved using MONTEBURNS [8] to 
approximate the isotopic distribution after operation at end of cycle (EOC) and after two years 
of cooling. 
Figure 1 below shows a diagram illustrating the 39 independent regions depleted in
MONTEBURNS, in which the color red highlights primarily non-depletable regions of water 
and the guide tubes (larger diameter circles). 1/8 bundle symmetry was used for the depletion 
process taking advantage of its symmetry. The fuel assembly was also assumed to have 
reflective boundary conditions surrounding the outer surface of the bundle.
Figure 1. MCNP5 Visual Editor Image of the Takahama-3 17x17 PWR Bundle.                 
Note that 1/8 of the fuel were used for depletion taking advantage of its symmetry.
2.1. The Source Term Distribution
Separate MCNP5 cases were run for neutron and gamma studies.  For the neutron flux source 
in these assemblies, we targeted the Cm-244 distribution in the assembly.  This is because for
typical commercial power spent fuel assemblies, the neutron flux inside spent fuel assemblies 
is expected to be dominated by the spontaneous fission neutrons from Cm-244 after two years
of cooling time.  Accordingly, the pin-by-pin neutron source strengths were established in the 
bundle in proportion to the Cm-244 relative accumulation. The neutron source was sampled
by the Watt fission spectrum and divided in 23 groups between 1.0E-05 and 20MeV, plus a 
total count.
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2.2. Preliminary Results
Results from pin-diverted cases were compared against cases with all spent fuel pins present, 
and the absolute difference and percent difference were calculated. Using standard error 
propagation, relative errors were calculated for both quantities.  A key indicator was whether 
the differences observed were greater than could be accounted by the margin of error of the 
results.  Assuming Maxwell statistics a hypothetical 60-second count was constructed from 
the MCNP5 flux. The absolute error was calculated as the square root of the count, and the 
relative error of the difference from the case where all spent fuel pins are present was 
calculated. 
The preliminary Monte Carlo simulation studies showed that indeed two dimensional neutron 
data, when obtained in the presence of missing pins, have data profiles distinctly different 
from the profiles obtained without missing pins. Replacing a single spent fuel pin in the 
assembly resulted in detectable differences in the neutron flux greater than the designated 
threshold in at least one energy group for most of the guide tubes, as summarized in Table 1.
Substitution of a pin by fresh fuel pin or Fe pin can show the difference in neutron 
measurement up to 2%. Substitution of two pins by fresh fuel pin can show the difference in 
neutron measurement more than 4.%. Figures 2,3 and 4 illustrate diagrams of the total neutron 
flux perturbations due to a corner and central pin diversion, providing some evidence of 
possible detectability.
Table 1: Summary of Neutron Results
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Figure 2. Neutron Flux Perturbation in Guide Tubes due to a Corner Pin Diversion
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Figure 3. Neutron Flux Perturbation in Guide Tubes due to a Central Pin Diversion
Figure 4. Neutron Flux Perturbation in Guide Tubes due to Two-Pin Diversion
3. Recent Results with Fission Chamber Model
Our early simulations focused primarily on MCNP tallies of neutron and gamma flux profiles 
within the guide tubes, and in assessing whether distinguishable differences could be detected 
in the gamma or neutron flux at each of the energy groups or bins selected.  However, in 
practice, available radiation measurement tools do not usually have the luxury of finely 
Flux (total neutron, near center replaced)
0
9
18
0 9 18
X
Y
Rod Positions
Flux difference in total
n's (FF)Pin replaced
with a fresh
fuel pin
Y
Flux (total neutron, 2 replaced FF)
0
9
18
0 9 18
X
Y Rod Positions
2 FFPin replaced
with fresh
fuel pins, 
positions
(6,4) and (7,4)
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divided energy tallies.  Thus, we proceeded to model a typical fission chamber such as the 
LND 30753 shown in Figure 5 as a diagram and as an MCNP model, side-by-side, with the 
general specifications provided in Table 2.
 
Figure 5. LND 30753 Fission Counter [10]
Table 2. General Specifications of LND 30753 Fission Counter
Maximum Diameter (inch/mm) 0.28 / 7.1
Effective Diameter (inch/mm) 0.18 / 4.6
Maximum Length (inch/mm) 2.34 / 59.4
Sensitive Length (inch/mm) 0.75 / 19.1
Cathode Material Nickel
Fill Gas Argon
Fill Pressure (Torr) 760
Connector Flying Lead
Figure 6, below,  Shows cross-sectional views of the MCNP model of this fission chamber 
inserted into the central guide tube of the assembly previously described.
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Figure 6. Cross-Sectional View of LND 307 Fission Counter in Central Guide Tube
Likewise, Figure 7, illustrates the expected impact of the detector’s presence within the 
guidetube upon the measurements.  
Missing Pin (10,9)
-1.5E+02
-1.0E+02
-5.0E+01
0.0E+00
5.0E+01
1.0E+02
1.5E+02
2.0E+02
2.5E+02
3.0E+02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Energy Group
N
e
u
t
r
o
n
F
L
u
x
with detector without detector
Figure 7. Neutron Flux Spectrum with and without Fission Chamber
4. Conclusions and Future Work
Monte Carlo simulations have been performed to help validate this concept using a realistic 
17x17 PWR spent fuel assembly.  The preliminary results of this study show that neutron 
profiles in the guide tubes, when obtained in the presence of missing pins, can be identifiably
different from the profiles obtained without missing pins. 
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There is still much work to be done in this area to establish a real experimental test.  Ongoing 
activities include:
· Uncertainty analysis related to the operational and cooling history, and the type of 
PWR assembly (15x15 or vintage models), in particular, assessment of asymmetric 
depletion upon detection ability.
· Assembly depletion in 3D using TRITON and/or MCNPX/CINDER’90
· Monte Carlo analyses performed in 3D
· Study of detector design and efficiencies associated, such as study of thin fission 
chamber position within guide tube, and axial displacement of chamber, multiple 
detectors (cluster).
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